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Abstract
Statistical agencies utilize models to synthesize respondent-level data for
release to the public for privacy protection. In this work, we efficiently in-
duce privacy protection into any Bayesian synthesis model by employing a
pseudo likelihood that exponentiates each likelihood contribution by an obser-
vation record-indexed weight ∈ [0, 1], defined to be inversely proportional to
the identification risk for that record. We start with the marginal probability
of identification risk for a record, which is composed as the probability that
the identity of the record may be disclosed. Our application to the Consumer
Expenditure Surveys (CE) of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrates
that the marginally risk-adjusted synthesizer provides an overall improved pri-
vacy protection; however, the identification risks actually increase for some
moderate-risk records after risk-adjusted pseudo posterior estimation synthesis
due to increased isolation after weighting; a phenomenon we label “whack-a-
mole”. We proceed to construct a weight for each record from a collection of
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pairwise identification risk probabilities with other records, where each pair-
wise probability measures the joint probability of re-identification of the pair of
records, which mitigates the whack-a-mole issue and produces a more efficient
set of synthetic data with lower risk and higher utility for the CE data.
keywords: Bayesian hierarchical models, Data privacy protection, Identi-
fication risks, Pairwise, Pseudo posterior, Synthetic data
1 Introduction
Statistical agencies collect respondent-level data, also known as microdata, from
households and business establishments through survey and census instruments. Re-
searchers and data analysts, additionally, often seek access to the respondent-level,
detailed data records from the statistical agencies in order to facilitate their research
inferential goals; for example, by conducting regression analyses using variables in
the respondent-level dataset. Indeed, statistical agencies often disseminate public use
microdata files to facilitate such purposes. Findings from these projects in turn help
policy makers to make data-driven decisions, and help citizens to understand their
communities better. In short, there are great benefits of disseminating microdata to
the public by statistical agencies.
When disseminating public use microdata files, however, statistical agencies are
under legal obligation to protect privacy and confidentiality of survey respondents
(U.S. Title 13). Therefore, the collected microdata has to undergo statistical disclo-
sure control (SDC) procedures before being released to the public.
Differential privacy is a formal privacy guarantee to add random noise to offer
privacy protection. It has been mostly developed on aggregated data format, such
as tables (Dwork et al., 2006). For microdata dissemination, the synthetic data
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approach is a promising strategy (Rubin, 1993; Little, 1993; Raghunathan et al.,
2003; Reiter and Raghunathan, 2007; Drechsler, 2011). Statistical agencies develop
Bayesian models, called “synthesizers”, applied to the original, confidential data.
They simulate records (i.e., microdata) from the posterior predictive distributions of
the estimated Bayesian models, and release the synthetic microdata to the public.
The disseminated synthetic data could preserve high utility, and keep low level of
disclosure risks, as demonstrated in the literature, recently by Paiva et al. (2014);
Quick et al. (2015); Wei and Reiter (2016); Quick et al. (2018); Quick and Waller
(2018); Hu et al. (2018); Manrique-Vallier and Hu (2018); Drechsler and Hu (2018); Hu
and Savitsky (2018). Public use synthetic microdata products include the synthetic
Longitudinal Business Database (Kinney et al., 2011, 2014), the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (Benedetto et al., 2013), and OnTheMap (Machanavajjhala
et al., 2008) by the U.S. Census Bureau, the IAB Establishment Panel (Drechsler
et al., 2008a,b) in Germany, and synthetic business microdata disseminated by the
Canadian Research Data Centre Network.
There has been a large amount of work on developing synthesizers to achieve high
level of utility of synthetic data, and on developing utility measures of synthetic data
(Karr et al., 2006; Snoke et al., 2018). The literature has largely shown that if the
synthesizers are carefully designed and tailored to the confidential microdata, the sim-
ulated synthetic data will maintain high utility of a set of commonly-used inferences;
however, a synthetic dataset that expresses high level of utility by preserving the
distribution properties of the real data (held close by the statistical agency) usually
also expresses relatively high disclosure risks. When disclosure risks are deemed too
high, commonly used strategies for reducing risk include synthesizing more variables,
and synthesizing at aggregated level of the variables (Drechsler and Hu, 2018); for
example, working with county-level locations instead of exact longitude and latitude
3
information.
We propose a general framework which leverages pseudo posterior to provide
higher privacy protection for high-risk records in the original, confidential dataset.
We first evaluate the identification risk of each record in the original data, denoted
as IRi for record i ∈ (1, · · · , n). The IRi is a marginal probability of identifica-
tion risk for record i, and the closer the IRi value to 1, the higher the identifi-
cation risk (i.e. probability of re-identification) of record i. Second, we design a
record-indexed weight αi ∈ [0, 1], based on IRi, which is inversely proportional to
IRi and bounded between 0 and 1. We introduce the collection of vector weights,
α = (αi ∈ [0, 1], · · · , αn ∈ [0, 1]) to exponentiate the likelihood contributions in a
pseudo likelihood framework that, when convolved with the prior distributions, pro-
duce a joint pseudo posterior distribution. (See Savitsky and Toth (2016) for back-
ground on a pseudo posterior distribution constructed in the case of complex survey
sampling). Data disseminators are then enabled to generate synthetic microdata
from the pseudo posterior predictive distribution. This construction surgically down-
weights the likelihood contributions of records with high identification risks (high IRi
produces low αi), and produces a risk-weighted synthesizer within a pseudo posterior
framework that is designed to produce an “efficient” reduction in disclosure risk; that
is, a relatively lesser loss of data utility in order to achieve a targeted disclosure risk
probability.
We use the proposed risk-adjusted synthesizer based on the marginal downweight-
ing approach (e.g., computing IRi for each unit, i ∈ (1, . . . , n)) to synthesize a highly-
skewed, disclosure sensitive family income variable in a sample collected for the Con-
sumer Expenditure Surveys (CE) at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We
observe not-yet-optimal risk profile of our proposed risk-adjusted synthesizer under
marginal downweighting: it unintentionally increases the identification disclosure risks
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for some records with moderate-risk in the real data; an issue we refer to as “whack-a-
mole”. The use of marginal weights may overly shrink the tail or extreme observations
and increase the relative isolation of a moderate-risk data record by further isolating
it, thus increasing its IRi. To alleviate this issue and better control the utility-risk
trade-off of the synthesizers, we further propose to formulate the weight for each
record by constructing a collection of joint, pairwise probabilities of identification
risk for that record with the other data records. Our use of pairwise identification
risk probabilities may be viewed as an adaptation of Williams and Savitsky (2018)
from the survey sampling case (where the weights are based on unit inclusion prob-
abilities into a sample of a finite population) to our risk-weighted pseudo posterior
framework.
The use of pairwise identification risk probabilities for formulating by-record
weights ties together the downweighting of records, and we show in the sequel that
it not only mitigates the whack-a-mole problem on the CE sample application, but
also improves the utility preservation, compared to the marginal downweighting ap-
proach. Having established the propriety of our pairwise downweight strategy, we
further construct and illustrate practical approaches for scaling and shifting the risk-
based weights that allow the statistical agency or data-disseminating organization to
achieve a desired utility-risk trade-off in the publicly-released synthetic microdata.
We illustrate our practical approaches on the CE sample data.
Section 1.1 introduces details of the CE sample data in our application and CE
survey program’s current topcoding practice of the family income variable in the CE
PUMD for disclosure control. Section 1.2 describes the finite mixture synthesizer
developed for the purpose of synthesizing the sensitive, highly-skewed family income
variable.
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Table 1: Variables used in the CE sample. Data taken from the 2017 Q1 Consumer
Expenditure Survey.
Variable Description
Gender Gender of the reference person; 2 categories
Age Age of the reference person; 5 categories
Education Level Education level of the reference person; 8 categories
Region Region of the CU; 4 categories
Urban Urban status of the CU; 2 categories
Marital Status Marital status of the reference person; 5 categories
Urban Type Urban area type of the CU; 3 categories
CBSA 2010 core-based statistical area (CBSA) status; 3 cate-
gories
Family Size Size of the CU; 11 categories
Earner Earner status of the reference person; 2 categories
Family Income Imputed and reported income before tax of the CU; ap-
proximate range: (-7K, 1,800K)
1.1 The CE data and the topcoded family income
The CE data sample in our application comes from 2017 1st quarter. There are n
= 6208 consumer units (CU) in this sample. We focus on 11 variables: the first
10 variables are either categorical in nature or discretized from continuous, consid-
ered insensitive, therefore not to be synthesized and used as predictors. The 11-th
variable, family income, is continuous, ranging from approximately -7K to 1,800K
(rounded for confidentiality; negative family income values reflect investment and
business loses). This variable is considered sensitive, therefore to be synthesized for
disclosure protection. See Table 1 for details of the variables.
The sensitive family income variable is highly right-skewed. The 97.5 percentile
value for this variable is approximately $270K. Currently, the CE PUMD releases
a topcoded version of the family income values to the public. Topcoding refers to
the practice of using a pre-chosen value and censoring any values above the pre-
chosen topcoded value to that value (An and Little, 2007). While the application of
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topcoding techniques induces disclosure protection by not releasing the exact value
of a CU’s family income for certain portions of the distribution (especially for the
extreme values), topcoding might negatively impact the utility of the microdata by
destroying important features of the distribution, especially in the tails. There is also
an implicit assumption in topcoding that high risk records are concentrated in the
right tail of the income distribution, which we show in the sequel to be false.
1.2 A finite mixture synthesizer
Our proposed synthesizer is a flexible, parametric finite mixture synthesizer for a
sensitive continuous variable, utilizing a number of available predictors. We now
describe the synthesizer in the context of the CE data sample; however, we believe this
synthesizer is generalizable and widely applicable for synthesizing skewed continuous
data.
Let yi be the logarithm of the family income for CU i, and Xi be the R× 1 vector
including an intercept and the values of predictors of CU i. There are n CUs in the
sample.
yi | Xi, zi,β, σ ∼ Normal(yi | X′iβ∗zi , (σ∗zi)2) (1)
zi | pi ∼ Multinomial(1;pi1, · · · , piK) (2)
Our finite mixture construction over-specifies the number of mixture components,
K, to facilitate the flexible clustering of CUs that employ the same generating distri-
bution component for y. Under our modeling setup, we sample locations, (β∗k, (σ
∗
k)
2)
and cluster indicators, zi ∈ (1, . . . , K), for CU i. The cluster indicators, (zi) are gen-
erated from multinomial draws with cluster probabilities, (pi1, · · · , piK) in Equation
(2).
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We induce sparsity in the number of clusters developed through our sampling of
the (pik) with,
(pi1, . . . , piK) ∼ Dirichlet
( γ
K
, . . . ,
γ
K
)
, (3)
γ ∼ Gamma(aγ, bγ). (4)
Although parametric, under this prior construction for (pi, γ), our model becomes
arbitrarily close to a Dirichlet process mixture for an unknown measure, F , specified
with generating model parameters, (βk, σ
2
k) ∼ F in the limit of K ↑ ∞ (Neal, 2000).
Our parametric formulation denotes a truncated Dirichlet process (TDP). The γ
hyperparameter induces sparsity in the number of non-zero cluster probabilities in
Equation (3). Due to its influence on the number of clusters learned by the data, we
further place a gamma prior on γ in Equation (4).
We specify multivariate normal priors for each regression coefficient vector of
coefficient locations, β∗k as in Equation (5), and t priors for each standard deviation
σ∗k as in Equation (6):
β∗k
iid∼ MVNR(0, diag(σβ)×
R×R
Ωβ ×diag(σβ)), (5)
σ∗k
iid∼ t(3, 0, 1), (6)
where the R × R correlation matrix, Ωβ, receives a uniform prior over the space of
R × R correlation matrices (Stan Development Team, 2016) and each component of
σβ receives a student-t prior with 3 degrees of freedom.
To generate synthetic family income of each CU, we first generate sample val-
ues of (pi(l),β∗,(l), σ∗,(l)) from the posterior distribution at MCMC iteration l. We
estimate our TDP mixture model using Stan (Stan Development Team, 2016), after
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marginalizing out the discrete cluster assignment probabilities, z. We generate cluster
assignments, a posteriori, from the full conditional distributions given, pi(l), with,
(zi | (pik), (yi), (β∗k , σ∗k)) = Multinomial
(
1;
[
pi1φ(yi | X′iβ∗1, σ∗1)
]
, . . . ,
[
piKφ(yi | X′iβ∗K , σ∗K)
])
,
(7)
where φ(·) denotes the density function of a normal distribution. We next generate
synthetic family income, {y∗,(l)i , i = 1, · · · , n}, through a normal draw given predictor
vectors {Xi, i = 1, · · · , n}, and samples of z(l),β∗,(l) and σ∗,(l), as in Equation (1). Let
Z(l) denote a partially synthetic dataset at MCMC iteration l. We repeat the process
for L times, creating L independent partially synthetic datasets Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(L)).
In practice, L can be 1 to reduce the level of disclosure; that is, releasing only one
synthetic dataset (Raab et al., 2016).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the risk-
weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer within the marginal downweighting framework
and applies it to the synthesis of CE family income. We demonstrate the whack-a-
mole problem that arises under marginal downweighting. Section 3 describes the risk-
weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer under a pairwise downweighting framework.
We apply the proposed pairwise downweighting framework to the synthesis of CE
family income and compare privacy protection and utility preservation to marginal
downweighting. We proceed to two local adjustments, scaling and shifting, to pairwise
weights in order to demonstrate tuning of utility-risk trade-off balance with risk-
weighted synthesizers. We conclude with a discussion in Section 4.
9
2 Marginal downweighting framework for risk-weighted
synthesis
We note that the marginal and pairwise downweight frameworks work with any
Bayesian synthesizer. For the rest of the paper, we use yi for the logarithm of the fam-
ily income for CU i ∈ (1, . . . , n), Xi for an R × 1 predictor vector for CU i. We use
the synthesizer to produce collections of synthetic datasets, {Z(1), · · · ,Z(L)} where
l ∈ (1, . . . , L) indexes the collection of synthesized data (e.g., by-record synthesized
values for yi), each drawn from the posterior predictive distribution of the synthesizer
estimated on the n × 1 vector y. Furthermore, we use θ for the model parameters,
and η for the model hyperparameters.
2.1 Marginal probability of identification disclosure
Our proposed marginal probability of identification disclosure is based on the commonly-
used expected match risk measure (Reiter and Mitra, 2009; Drechsler, 2011), and
adapted to continuous data. We recognize limitations of any risk measures with
assumptions of intruder’s behavior and knowledge (Hu, 2019). In practice, data dis-
seminators should focus on disclosure risk measures that are most appropriate in their
application. In cases where attribute disclosure poses higher concern than identifi-
cation disclosure, a vector of record-level probabilities of attribute disclosure can be
developed accordingly.
The released L synthetic datasets, Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(L)), are made publicly avail-
able by the statistical agency (while the y are closely-held). Suppose a putative
intruder seeks identities of records within each synthetic dataset, Z(l). In addition to
Z(l), assume the intruder has access to an external file, which contains the following
10
information on each CU, i: i) a known pattern of the un-synthesized categorical vari-
ables, Xpi ⊆ Xi; for example, a pattern, p ∈ P , may be formed from {Gender, Age,
Education} variables where each unique combination of levels contains a count of
records; ii) the true value of synthesized family income yi; and iii) a name or identity
of a person or CU of interest. An intruder who successfully discovers the identity of a
record is rewarded by accessing the remaining variables in Xi outside the known pat-
tern of categorical variables. With access to such external information, the intruder
may attempt to determine the identity of the CU for record i ∈ (1, . . . , n) by first
performing matches based on the known pattern Xpi . Let M
(l)
p,i be the collection of
CUs sharing the pattern p with CU i for synthetic dataset Z(l), l ∈ (1, . . . , L). Let
the cardinality, |M (l)p,i |, denote the number of CUs in M (l)p,i . Note that the intruder will
base their interrogation of the records in M
(l)
p,i on the synthesized family income for
those records, not their real data values (which are unknown to the intruder).
Armed with the knowledge of the true value of family income yi of CU i, the
intruder will seek those records whose synthetic values, y∗,(l), are “close” to the true
data value yi, where y
∗,(l) denotes the synthesized income value in Z(l). Intuitively,
if there are few records with synthetic values y∗,(l) close to yi, the identification
disclosure risk will be higher if the true record is among those records that are close
to y∗,(l) because the true value, yi is not well “covered”. The intruder is assumed
to randomly select a record (since each is otherwise identical in pattern and close to
the truth) from only a few records in the case yi is not well covered, elevating their
probability of correctly identifying record i.
To formally define “close”, let B(yi, r) denote a ball of radius r around true value
yi, the family income. (In the case of a univariate variable of interest, y, the ball
reduces to an interval, though we use the term “ball” throughout as our framework
readily applies to the multivariate case). Let indicator T
(l)
i = 1, if the synthetic data
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value for record i, y
∗,(l)
i , is among those records, h ∈M (l)p,i whose y∗,(l)h ∈ B(yi, r); that
is, T
(l)
i = 1 if the synthesized value for record i is close (within a ball of radius, r) to
the true value yi. We define the probability of identification for record i as:
IR
(l)
i =
∑
h∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r)
)
|M (l)p,i |
× T (l)i , (8)
where I(·) is the indicator function. This identification disclosure risk is constructed
as the probability that the synthetic values for records in the known pattern p are not
close to the truth. In other words, if there are relatively few records in the pattern
close (within a ball of radius r) to the truth, the intruder has a higher probability of
guessing the record of the name they seek. The choice of r connotes a notion of close
that we use to identify (the synthetic data value for) a record as isolated using the
complement of close. The value for r is set by the statistical agency as a policy choice.
A more conservative agency will select a relatively smaller value for r, which produces
a higher probability that a record is isolated, therefore produces a higher identification
risk to the extent that the indicator T
(l)
i = 1. In other words, the synthetic data value
y
∗,(l)
i for target record i is within radius r of the true datum value yi. As the radius
shrinks, each record become relatively more isolated, though T
(l)
i is more likely to
flip from 1 to 0. This flipping phenomenon will be more pronounced in relatively
well-mixing synthesizers. In practice, r is set through specifying a percentage of yi
(e.g., we utilize 20% in our applications to follow) in order to allow the magnitude
of the radius of closeness to adapt to the magnitude of the data value. Statistical
agencies find the setting of r in this way to be more intuitive.
To illustrate, we provide three toy examples of identifying “Betty”, where the
number of CUs sharing the same pattern as Betty, p, is |M (l)p,i | = 13. In each scenario,
we include the values of
∑
h∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r)
)
, T
(l)
i , and IR
(l)
i in the figure
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caption. r is the radius of the ball and assumed the same in both scenarios. Additional
toy examples can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Figure 1: Legends for Betty’s true value, Betty’s synthetic value, and other synthetic
values.
Figure 2 illustrates the case where few records in the pattern are close to Betty’s
true record value for y. This scenario leads to a relatively higher identification dis-
closure probability. Figure 3 illustrates the case where Betty’s true value for y is well
covered by many records in the pattern. This scenario leads to a relatively lower
probability of identification disclosure. Figure 4 is similar to the case of Figure 2,
but now Betty’s true value for y is not close to her synthesized value, which leads to
T
(l)
i = 0 and an identification disclosure probability of 0.
Figure 2:
∑
h∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r)
)
= 10, T
(l)
i = 1, and IR
(l)
i =
10
13
× 1 = 10
13
.
Figure 3:
∑
h∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r)
)
= 5, T
(l)
i = 1, and IR
(l)
i =
5
13
× 1 = 5
13
.
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Figure 4:
∑
h∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r)
)
= 10, T
(l)
i = 0, and IR
(l)
i =
10
13
× 0 = 0.
We take the average of IR
(l)
i across L synthetic datasets and use IRi =
1
L
∑L
l=1 IR
(l)
i
as the final record-level identification disclosure risk for CU i. These IRi’s are used
to determine the level of privacy protection to encode in the synthetic datasets Z,
for each CU, individually. We now proceed to construct the marginal record-level
weights, (αm1 , · · · , αmn ) (where the superscript, “m” denotes “marginal” to differenti-
ate this construction from a pairwise weighting-based formulation that follows) from
the marginal record-level identification disclosure risk measures, (IR1, · · · , IRn). We
apply the weights to pseudo posterior framework to create synthetic data that pro-
duces improved disclosure protection.
2.2 Pseudo posterior risk-adjusted synthesizer
When the identification disclosure risk IRi of CU i is relatively high, the likelihood
contribution of CU i will be downweighted, which in turn strengthens the influence
of the prior distribution for CU i. Therefore, the record-level weights (αm1 , . . . , α
m
n )
should be inversely proportional to the identification disclosure risks, (IR1, . . . , IRn).
We propose the following formulation, which guarantees the weights ∈ [0, 1]:
αmi = min((1− IRi), 1), (9)
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where IRi is the identification disclosure risk of CU i. Suppose CU i expresses a
marginal identification risk probability, IRi = 0.7, its weight is computed as α
m
i =
min((1− 0.7), 1) = 0.3.
We formulate the following marginally risk-adjusted pseudo-posterior distribution
to induce misspecification into our re-estimated synthesizer,
pαm (θ | y,X,η) ∝
[
n∏
i=1
p (yi | X,θ)α
m
i
]
p (θ | η) , (10)
where X denotes the predictor matrix, θ denotes the model parameters, and η denotes
the model hyperparameters. We then generate a collection of synthetic datasets,
ZM , from this marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer. This procedure
surgically distorts the high risk portions in the data distribution to produce new
synthetic datasets with higher disclosure protection.
Our use of weight αi applied to the likelihood of observation yi can be seen as
an anti-informative prior, as in 1/ (p (yi | X,θ))1−α
m
i applied to the full likelihood for
CU i. The weights αm are purposefully designed to partially defeat the likelihood
principle to induce misspecification, targeting only the high-risk portion of the dis-
tribution. Furthermore, the weights are dependent on the real data, y, which the
statistical agency holds private and considers known. We therefore do not model
the weights αm with the data y in order to smooth the weights since the risks on
which these weights are computed are viewed as exact. It also bears mention that the
αm are utilized to selectively downweight likelihood contributions to induce further
misspecification into our synthesizer, so that further smoothing of αm under a model
would undo our intent. Therefore, we use the weights as plug-in to surgically distort
high risk portion of the distribution.
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2.3 Application to synthesis of CE family income, y
We utilize two synthesizers on the CE sample to synthesize the sensitive family income
variable using 10 categorical predictors: i) The finite mixture unweighted synthesizer
(labeled “Synthesizer”); ii) The marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer
from Section 2.2 (labeled “Marginal”). For comparison, we also include evaluation of
the publicly available, topcoded family income (labeled “Topcoding”).
For each synthesizer or topcoding procedure, the resulting by-record distribution
of identification risks based on the marginal probability of identification risk in Section
2.1 are evaluated for synthetic data or topcoded microdata, with r = 20% (i.e. the
final radius value for record i is r × yi = 0.2 × yi). We assume the intruder has
an external file with information on {Gender, Age, Region} for each of the n =
6208 CUs. The intersecting values of these known-to-intruder predictors produces
40 known patterns, and each pattern has more than 1 CUs (e.g., no pattern with
singletons). We generate L = 20 synthetic datasets for each synthesizer. We choose
L > 1 to make sure that the risk profiles to be evaluated and compared are not
influenced by any one synthetic dataset, but the averages across L = 20 synthetic
datasets. We note that in practice, L can be set to 1 to reduce the level of disclosure.
We next evaluate and compare the risk profiles of two synthesizers and the topcoded
microdata.
2.3.1 Identification disclosure risks
To compare the risk profiles of the synthetic and topcoded datasets, we use violin
(density) plots shown in Figure 5. Each violin plot shows the distribution (∈ [0, 1])
of the calculated identification risk probabilities (i.e. IRi’s) for all n = 6208 CUs in
the CE sample. The higher the identification risk probability, the lower the privacy
16
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Figure 5: Violin plots of the identification risk probability distributions of the con-
fidential CE sample, the unweighted synthesizer, the Marginal risk-weighted pseudo
posterior synthesizer, and the Topcoded microdata. The horizontal line in each violin
plot denotes the mean. All results are based on r = 20%.
protection, and vice versa. The identification risk profile of the confidential data
(labeled “Data”) is included for comparison. The columns Synthesizer and Marginal
in Table 2 displays the identification risk for the top 10 risky records as measured
from real data and output from the unweighted synthesizer and the marginally risk-
weighted pseudo posterior and from the topcoding procedure. In Table 2 the range,
instead of the actual data value of family income, is provided in column “Value” for
confidentiality.
We observe that the Synthesizer produces significant risk reduction compared
to the Data due to prior smoothing of the real data distribution. The Marginal
further lowers the overall identification disclosure risks as compared to the Synthe-
sizer by surgically downweighting the likelihood contributions of relatively high risk
records. This confirms and demonstrates that our proposed marginal downweighting
framework provides higher disclosure protection, reducing the peak record-level iden-
tification disclosure risks. Marginal downweighting shrinks or concentrates high-risk
records towards main modes of the distribution as we note by nearly 0 risk values
17
Table 2: Table of identification risks for top 10 risky records.
Value Data Synthesizer Marginal Topcoding
(-10K, 50K) 0.9944 0.0000 0.0000 0.9894
(100K, 1000K) 0.9944 0.0995 0.0000 0.0000
(-10K, 50K) 0.9921 0.1454 0.0000 0.9582
(-10K, 50K) 0.9915 0.0000 0.0496 0.9926
(100K, 1000K) 0.9913 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000
(-10K, 50K) 0.9913 0.1469 0.0000 0.9852
(-10K, 50K) 0.9913 0.0491 0.0000 0.9707
(100K, 1000K) 0.9910 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-10K, 50K) 0.9910 0.1471 0.0000 0.9894
(1000K, 2000K) 0.9910 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
produced for the top 10 risky records by the Marginal in Table 2.
Table 3 presents the probabilities of identification disclosure for the largest or
highest-magnitude income records. While the intention of topcoding is to provide
disclosure protection, topcoding only provides such protection on CUs with extremely
large family income (as is evident in their long tails and large bulbs around 0 in Figure
5 and the column Topcoding in Table 3). At the same time, since the majority of the
family income is not topcoded (about 6% are topcoded), topcoding fails to provide any
disclosure protection to most of the CUs that express high identification disclosure
risks (as evident in their upper portions in Figure 5). Their identification disclosure
risks are high because their family income is unchanged, resulting in only a single
value near the target income, while yet T
(l)
i = 1 (which is a maximum risk situation).
2.3.2 The whack-a-mole problem
As we have seen, the Marginal provides further privacy protection for records with
high identification risks by downweighting their likelihood contribution. This risk re-
duction is achieved by shrinking the synthetic data value for each high-risk record to
the main modes of the distribution, which in turn reduces its relative isolation from
18
Table 3: Table of identification risks for top 10 size / magnitude records.
Value Data Synthesizer Marginal Topcoding
(1000K, 2000K) 0.9910 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1000K, 2000K) 0.9643 0.0499 0.0000 0.0000
(1000K, 2000K) 0.9600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9820 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9913 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9565 0.0995 0.0000 0.9955
(100K, 1000K) 0.9910 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9872 0.0994 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9944 0.0995 0.0000 0.0000
(100K, 1000K) 0.9908 0.0000 0.0482 0.0000
other records (and we note that it is easier for a putative intruder to identify data
records with relatively unique values). The shrinking of a high-risk record towards the
main modes, however, may increase the isolation of a relatively moderate-risk record
with the result that the identification risk may, actually, increase after re-estimation
under the Marginal as compared to the Synthesizer. We term this undesirable phe-
nomenon as “whack-a-mole”, where the Marginal unintentionally increases the risk in
the synthetic data value of a moderate-risk real data record by increasing its relative
isolation. It then becomes difficult to control the overall risk profile of the synthetic
data under use of the Marginal, since the marginal probability of identification risk
of some records increases relative to the Synthesizer, simultaneously with a decrease
in the identification risk for previously high-risk data records. Figure 6 highlights
records (in yellow) in the CE sample whose marginal probability of identification risk
has been increased by 0.25, from the synthetic data drawn under the unweighted
Synthesizer to the synthetic data drawn under the Marginal; that is, the Marginal
increases records with moderate levels of identification risks under the Synthesizer to
high identification risks, even though it successfully provides higher privacy protection
for records with high identification risks, and provides an overall lower or downshifted
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of marginal probabilities of identification risk of records using
the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer (y-axis) and marginal probabilities of
identification risk of records using the unweighted synthesizer (x-axis).
identification risk distribution for the entire dataset as compared to the Synthesizer
(supported by a majority of records fall under the blue y = x line in Figure 6, in
addition to Figure 5 and Table 2).
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows that the Marginal does not well control the maximum
identification risk. For example, suppose the statistical agency sets 0.5 as a threshold
that no synthetic records should possess identification risk greater than 0.5. As can be
seen in the number of records with identification risk exceeding 0.5 on the y-axis, the
synthetic data produced by the Marginal does not satisfy such requirement, therefore
the set of synthetic data records cannot be released to the public.
We proceed to focus on mitigating the whack-a-mole phenomenon to achieve more
satisfactory risk profiles of the simulated synthetic data. Our main strategy formulates
the weight for each record by constructing a collection of joint, pairwise probabilities
of identification risk for that record with the other data records, to which we now
turn.
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3 Pairwise downweighting framework for risk-weighted
synthesizers
3.1 Pairwise probability of identification risk
We construct a pairwise identification risk probability for each pair of CUs (i, j) that
are in the same known pattern of un-synthesized categorical variables. Let M
(l)
p,(i,j)
index the collection of CUs in the confidential data sharing the same pattern p, with
CUs i and j in synthetic dataset Z(l). Similar to |M (l)p,i | in Equation (8), |M (l)p,(i,j)|
denotes the number of CUs in the M
(l)
p,(i,j) collection. As before, B(yi, r) casts a
ball of radius r around the true family income of CU i, yi; similarly, with B(yj, r)
for CU j. We next measure the probability of the event that the family income in
the confidential data for each CU, h ∈ M (l)p,(i,j), lies in the intersection defined by
y
∗,(l)
h ∈ B(yi, r) and y∗,(l)h ∈ B(yj, r), jointly. These intersections are used to construct
a joint identification risk probability, IR
(l)
i,j for the pair of CUs (i, j) as:
IR
(l)
i,j =
∑
h∈M(l)
p,(i,j)
I
(
y
∗,(l)
h /∈ B(yi, r) ∩ y∗,(l)h /∈ B(yj, r)
)
|M (l)p,(i,j)|
× T (l)i,j . (11)
For pairs of CUs (i, j) assigned to different known patterns, the joint identification
risk probability is set to 0 (i.e. IR
(l)
i,j = 0). Next, we use these joint identification
risk probabilities to formulate dependent, by-record probability-based weights for the
pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer.
3.2 Pseudo posterior and risk-adjusted synthesizer
We proceed to construct pairwise probability-based weight αpwi for CU i, using the
collection of pairwise identification risk probabilities, IR
(l)
i,j , for each i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
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First, for each j ∈M (l)p,(i,j), define the pairwise weight for CUs (i, j) as:
α
(l)
i,j = 1− IR(l)i,j , (12)
for synthetic dataset Z(l), l ∈ (1, . . . , L). This definition constructs the pairwise weight
α
(l)
i,j to be inversely proportional to the pairwise identification risk probability IR
(l)
i,j :
higher IR
(l)
i,j results in lower α
(l)
i,j , and vice versa. Furthermore, α
(l)
i,j ∈ [0, 1].
Second, we construct the normalized weight, α˜
(l)
i ∈ [0, 1] for CU i, by summing
over all α
(l)
i,j for j 6= i, and dividing by |M (l)p,i | − 1 to account for the |M (l)p,i | − 1 times
that CU i appears in the combination of pairs in pattern p:
α˜
(l)
i =
∑
j 6=i,j∈M(l)p,i
α
(l)
i,j
|M (l)p,i | − 1
. (13)
The normalized weight, α˜
(l)
i ∈ [0, 1], reflects the amount of downweighting needed
for CU i, based on the sum over all pairwise identification risk probabilities associated
with CU i, {IR(l)i,j , j 6= i, j ∈ M (l)p,i}. To see the inverse proportionality between α˜(l)i
and {IR(l)i,j , j 6= i, j ∈ M (l)p,i} more clearly, we can rewrite Equation (13) in terms of
IR
(l)
i,j :
α˜
(l)
i =
∑
j 6=i,j∈M(l)p,i
α
(l)
i,j
|M (l)p,i | − 1
=
∑
j 6=i,j∈M(l)p,i
(1− IR(l)i,j)
|M (l)p,i | − 1
=
|M (l)p,i | − 1−
∑
j 6=i,j∈M(l)p,i
IR
(l)
i,j
|M (l)p,i | − 1
= 1−
∑
j 6=i,j∈M(l)p,i
IR
(l)
i,j
|M (l)p,i | − 1
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that when the sum of pairwise identification risk probabilities
associated with CU i is high, the normalized weight α˜
(l)
i will be low and closer to 0.
Such inverse proportionality is desired, because we want to insert more downweighting
22
on CUs with high identification risks for further privacy protection. We take α˜i =
1
L
∑L
l=1 α˜
(l)
i as the final normalized weight for CU i.
We recall that the whack-a-mole phenomenon in the marginal downweighting
framework arises as distribution mass is shifted in the synthetic data from the real
data, due to shrinking of family income values for isolated high-risk records towards
the main modes of the distribution. This shrinking of values for high-risk records may
in turn reduce the number of records whose values are close to or cover a moderate-risk
record (measured for the confidential data), with the result that measured risk in the
synthetic data for a record whose risk is measured as moderate under the unweighted
synthesizer, may actually increase under the marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizer. It is this increase in risks in the synthetic data for moderate-risk records
within the confidential data that induces difficulty to control the overall risk level
across records.
Now within the pairwise downweighting framework, the set of (α˜i) within each
pattern are constructed as dependent. These probability-based weights are there-
fore formulated to reduce the degree of shrinking of each high-risk record and leave
moderate-risk records more covered in the synthetic data, such that the risks of these
records increase less than those in the synthetic data within the marginal down-
weighting framework. We demonstrate in Section 3.3 that the pairwise downweight-
ing framework induces a compression in the distribution of by-record identification
risk probabilities (measured as marginal probabilities of identification risk), which
results by the dependence among the (α˜i). This compression in the distribution of
identification risk probabilities helps reduce the whack-a-mole phenomenon.
The final pairwise probability-based weight, αpwi , for CU i, is defined as α
pw
i =
min(α˜i, 1). Our pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer has the same form
as specified in Section 2.2 for the marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer;
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namely,
pαpw (θ | y,X,η) ∝
[
n∏
i=1
p (yi | X,θ)α
pw
i
]
p (θ | η) , (15)
where X denotes the predictor matrix, θ denotes the model parameters, and η denotes
the model hyperparameters. We then generate a collection of synthetic datasets, ZPW ,
from this pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer.
3.3 Application to synthesis of CE family income
We utilize three synthesizers on the CE sample to synthesize the sensitive family
income variable using 10 categorical predictors: i) The finite mixture unweighted
synthesizer (labeled “Synthesizer”); ii) The marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizer from Section 2.2 (labeled “Marginal”); iii) The pairwise risk-weighted
pseudo posterior synthesizer from Section 3.2 (labeled “Pairwise”).
The resulting by-record distribution of identification risks based on the marginal
probability of identification risk in Section 2.1 are evaluated for synthetic datasets
drawn under each of three synthesizers, with r = 20% (i.e. the final radius value for
record i is r× yi = 0.2× yi). Similar to the application in Section 2.3, we assume the
intruder has an external file with information on {Gender, Age, Region} for each of
the n = 6208 CUs, resulting in 40 known patterns. We next evaluate and compare
the profiles of identification risks and utility preservation for all synthesizers.
3.3.1 Identification disclosure risks
Side-by-side violin plots of the identification risk probability distributions for the
three synthesizers are presented in Figure 7. Each violin plot shows the distribution
(∈ [0, 1]) of the calculated identification risk probabilities (i.e. IRi’s) for all n = 6208
CUs in the CE sample. The higher the identification risk probability, the lower the
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Figure 7: Violin plots of the identification risk probability distributions of the con-
fidential CE sample, the unweighted synthesizer, the Marginal risk-weighted pseudo
posterior synthesizer, and the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer.
The horizontal line in each violin plot denotes the mean.
privacy protection, and vice versa.
Between the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, the Pairwise provides
a shorter tail, as well as a more concentrated identification risk distribution, compared
to the Marginal. With similar average identification risk probabilities (the horizontal
bars), the Pairwise has an inter quartile range (IQR) of 0.1385, compared to 0.1534
of Marginal, highlighting that the Pairwise induces a compression in the by-record
identification risks computed on the synthetic data within the pairwise downweighting
framework. All to say, the Pairwise produces a relatively lower, more compressed
identification risk distribution than that of the Marginal in a fashion that offers more
control to the BLS. Constructing the by-record, pairwise probability-based weights,
(αpwi ) to be dependent ties the shrinking of records together in a fashion that reduces
the loss of coverage for moderate-risk records after risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesis due to the whack-a-mole phenomenon, compared to the Marginal. We also
note that mean identification risk across the records is essentially the same for both
the Marginal and the Pairwise as shown in the horizontal line within in each violin
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plot, indicating that both distributions are centered similarly. It is the difference in
the relative concentration of their masses and the maximum identification risk values
that differentiate them.
Furthermore, we note that there is a substantial downward shift in the identi-
fication risk distributions for the Marginal and the Pairwise, on the one hand, as
compared to the Synthesizer, on the other hand. This shift may be seen by focusing
on the bottom portion of the distributions where there is much more distribution
mass for identification risks (measured as marginal probabilities of identification risk)
< 0.25.
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Figure 8: Scatterplot of identification
risk of records using the Marginal risk-
weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer (y-
axis) and identification risk of records us-
ing the unweighted Synthesizer (x-axis).
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Figure 9: Scatterplot of identification
risk of records using the Pairwise risk-
weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer (y-
axis) and identification risk of records us-
ing the unweighted Synthesizer (x-axis).
It bears noting that the Pairwise has not fully resolved the whack-a-mole phe-
nomenon, though it has notably lessened it. Figure 9 depicts a scatterplot highlight-
ing the whack-a-mole phenomenon in the Pairwise. Compared to that in the Marginal
in Figure 8, the whack-a-mole phenomenon in the Pairwise is less severe, as can be
seen by the overall smaller values on the y-axis of the highlighted CUs (whose iden-
tification risk has increased by 0.25 from the Synthesizer to the Pairwise). We also
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observe in Figure 9 that there are fewer CUs with higher than 0.5 identification risk
in the Pairwise than in the Marginal, a feature that also reduces the tail length in
the identification risk distribution violin plot shown in Figure 7.
3.3.2 Utility
To evaluate utility of the resulting synthetic datasets under our alternative synthe-
sizers, we report the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of several key
summary statistics: the mean, the median, and the 90% quantile that characterize
the distribution of the family income variable, estimated from the collection of L = 20
synthetic datasets drawn from each synthesizer (Synthesizer, Marginal and Pairwise)
and presented in Table 4 and Table 5. All point estimates and 95% confidence inter-
vals are obtained through bootstrapping. In addition, in Table 5 (right), we report
the regression coefficient of Earner 2 (corresponding to the level that the reference
person is not an earner), in a regression analysis of family income on three predictors,
{Region, Urban, Earner}. The point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the
regression coefficient are obtained by standard combining rules for partially synthetic
data (Reiter and Raghunathan, 2007). In each table, the “Data” row corresponds
to the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval based on the confidential CE
sample; the “Synthesizer”, “Marginal”, and “Pairwise” rows correspond to the point
estimates and the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the three synthesizers.
All tables show high level preservation of utility by the Synthesizer. Yet, while
Figure 7 reveals that the Synthesizer substantially reduces the risk distribution com-
pared to the Data, the Synthesizer still produces an average marginal probability of
identification risk of 25%, which may be deemed as too high by the BLS. Additional
risk reduction is offered by the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, but at
the cost of some loss of utility in their synthetic datasets. The utility results in Table
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Table 4: Table of C.I. of mean (left) and median (right) family income; results based
on the Marginal and the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I. estimate 95% C.I.
Data 72090.26 [70127.02, 74053.50] 50225.15 [48995.01, 52000.00]
Synthesizer 72377.12 [70412.90, 74415.81] 50538.50 [49043.63, 52115.76]
Marginal 76641.95 [72638.03, 81817.03] 54229.08 [52877.58, 55537.29]
Pairwise 73184.83 [70887.88, 75626.18] 51692.10 [50235.51, 53052.61]
4 and Table 5 show that such privacy protection comes at a probably unacceptable
utility reduction in the Marginal: none of the 95% credible interval contains the point
estimate from the Data.
The Pairwise, by contrast, also expresses some utility reduction, though the re-
duction is relatively minor such that inference is unchanged and much less than that
of the Marginal, while yet producing a similarly-reduced risk distribution, which is
a notable reduction from the Synthesizer, shown in Figure 7. The Pairwise achieves
higher level of utility preservation than the Marginal because it shrinks the tail or
extreme observations less to achieve the same risk level. By pairing records when
computing risks, the Pairwise covers each risky record with other records whose val-
ues are nearby. This extra coverage leaves these records with less risk as compared to
the Marginal, which shrinks records one-at-a-time, such that high-risk records may be
over-shrunk towards a mode of the distribution of income values. Based on these re-
sults, we recommend the Pairwise to the BLS as a solution that offers further privacy
protection while maintaining a reasonably high level of utility preservation.
In sum, the Pairwise offers further privacy protection, compared to the unweighted
Synthesizer. The extra privacy protection comes at the cost of a minor level of
utility reduction. Overall, the Pairwise creates a better balance of utility-risk trade-
off, compared to the Marginal. It is worth noting that we also examined three-way
identification risk probabilities to assess whether further improvement in the whack-
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Table 5: Table of C.I. of 90% quantile (left) and predictor Earner 2 (right) of family
income; results based on the Marginal and the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers. Note that Earner 2 indicates that the reference person is not an earner.
estimate 95% C.I. estimate 95% C.I.
Data 153916.30 [147582.40, 159603.80] -45826.20 [-49816.29, -41836.11]
Synthesizer 152597.10 [147647.40, 157953.80] -46017.29 [-50239.20, -41795.37]
Marginal 134582.40 [130716.50, 138516.00] -34738.85 [-46792.90, -22684.81]
Pairwise 145968.90 [141137.70, 150867.30] -44028.77 [-49340.69, -38716.85]
a-mole phenomenon was observed, but discovered little improvement at the price of
a less scalable computation.
We now turn to methods of additional weights adjustments to improve the level
of utility preservation with acceptable loss of privacy protection. The two proposed
strategies could allow the BLS and other statistical agencies to further tune the risk-
weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off.
3.4 Two local adjustments
3.4.1 Methods
In Section 3.3, the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, the Marginal and
the Pairwise, have been demonstrated to offer higher privacy protection, compared
to the unweighted Synthesizer. The Pairwise gives better control of the overall risk
profile and the tail of the record-level identification risk distribution by compression,
while maintaining a relatively high level of utility preservation. The Marginal, by
contrast, provides better privacy protection than the Synthesizer, but with a bigger
compromise on utility.
In this section, we assume that the BLS is satisfied with the privacy protection
levels offered by the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, but not yet
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satisfied with their levels of utility preservation. We propose methods to increase
their utility preservation levels, with acceptable loss of the privacy protection. We
now proceed to describe the two strategies for achieving a desired utility-risk trade-
off balance by the BLS. We focus on the Pairwise due to its superior performance
in the trade-off between utility and risk performances, offering notably better risk
protection than the Synthesizer for slightly reduced utility. Strategies, results and
discussion of the marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer are included
in the Supplementary Material for brevity.
The first strategy utilizes a scaling constant c to be applied to the final pairwise
probability-based weights in Equation (16). This scaling constant c serves as a tuning
parameter for the BLS to control the amount of downweighting of all CUs; for exam-
ple, for CU i with αpwi = 0.5, the increasing of c = 1 to c = 1.5, lifts the final pairwise
weight of this CU, αpw∗i , from 1× 0.5 = 0.5 to 1.5× 0.5 = 0.75, which translates to a
decrease of the amount of downweighting by 0.25. Increasing the pairwise weight will
increase the likelihood contribution of CU i in the corresponding risk-weighted pseudo
posterior synthesizer, and is expected to result in higher level of utility preservation.
αpw∗i = min(c× αpwi , 1) (16)
In the limit of increasing c under the setup of Equation (16), each CU receives a
weight of 1, which turns the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer to
the unweighted synthesizer. We consider the Synthesizer (i.e. weights = 1) as the
best scenario of utility preservation. A risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer
induces misspecification in the pseudo likelihood. It surgically distorts the portion of
the distribution with high identification risks. The induced misspecification translates
to less-than-1 weights for some records. Such reduction in weights in turn produces
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synthetic datasets with lower level of utility preservation.
Yet, it is important to note that the scaling constant c affects the CUs differently.
For example, for another CU j with αpwj = 0.2, the increase to α
pw∗
j is 0.1 when
c is increased from c = 1 to c = 1.5. By contrast, an increase of 0.25 occurs for
CU i with αpwi = 0.5, producing α
pw∗
i = 0.75. Tuning c affects all CUs, but to
different degrees. Figure 11 plots the pairwise weights (y-axis) against family income
for all CUs and shows the effects of c = 1.5 on the final pairwise weights of all CUs,
compared to Figure 10 where c = 1. A greater-than-1 value of c induces a stretching
in the final pairwise weights: it affects CUs with higher weights to a greater degree by
producing larger magnitude increases of their weights, which is an obvious property
of scaling (but, nevertheless, worth noting due to its impact on the identification risk
distribution).
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Figure 10: Pairwise
weights, c = 1, g = 0.
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Figure 11: Pairwise
weights, c = 1.5, g = 0.
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Figure 12: Pairwise
weights, c = 1, g = 0.1.
Another approach to adjusting the pairwise weights applies a constant with equal
effect on the final pairwise weights of all CUs. This can be done through adding a
constant g in the final pairwise weights construction, as in Equation (17). Figure 12
illustrates the case with g = 0.1 while keeping c = 1. Compared to Figure 10, the
pairwise weight of every CU is increased by 0.1 in Figure 12, showing that the effect
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of g is equally applied to the final pairwise weight of each CU, because the additive
constant, g, shifts the distribution of by-record identification risks. A positive g
increases the likelihood contribution of all CUs by the same amount, and is expected
to result in higher level utility preservation, as every weight is closer to 1 than before.
αpw∗i = min(c× αpwi + g, 1) (17)
It is important to note that when setting c = 1 and g = 0 in Equation (17),
we obtain the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer in the application
in Section 3.3. Figure 10 illustrates this basic setup, and we observe how utilizing
the pairwise identification risk probabilities to construct weights produces a selective
downweighting of CUs as compared to the unweighted Synthesizer where every CU
receives a weight of 1. The majority of the CUs under the Pairwise shown in Figure
10 receive weights around 0.25, with just a few CUs having weights of 1 and many
CUs with large or extremely large family income values having weights as low as 0.1.
We utilize the pairwise weights that adjust the unweighted Synthesizer in order to
achieve a relatively large or global effect on the utility-risk trade-off. The further
tuning of the pairwise weights using c and g are designed to induce a relatively small
or local effect on the resulting by-record weights to allow a more precise setting of
the utility-risk trade-off balance sought by the statistical agency. A greater-than-1
value of c has a stretching effect on the distribution of the pairwise weights, while a
positive value of g induces an upward shift in the weight distribution. It is possible to
tune c and g at the same time. For simplicity and illustration purpose, we evaluate
tuning only one of these two parameters.
It bears mention that one may set c < 1 and g < 0 in the case the statistical
agency desires to locally adjust the risks further downward. We decide to focus on
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Table 6: Table of C.I. of mean (left) and median (right) family income; results based
on different Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I. estimate 95% C.I.
Data 72090.26 [70127.02, 74053.50] 50225.15 [48995.01, 52000.00]
Synthesizer 72377.12 [70412.90, 74415.81] 50538.50 [49043.63, 52115.76]
c = 1, g = 0 73184.83 [70887.88, 75626.18] 51692.10 [50235.51, 53052.61]
c = 1.5, g = 0 71695.49 [69780.83, 73708.90] 51791.43 [50339.41, 53283.75]
c = 1, g = 0.1 72421.46 [70393.96, 74544.11] 51403.06 [49975.29, 52869.75]
the c > 1 and g > 0 cases of allowing a bit more risk to improve utility because
it is the situation faced by the BLS on the CE sample data. We now turn to the
utility and identification risk profiles of the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers with these local weights adjustments.
3.4.2 Results
For the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, we consider three varia-
tions of the final pairwise weights in Equation (17): i) c = 1, g = 0; ii) c = 1.5, g = 0;
and iii) c = 1, g = 0.1. The choice of the radius r, the assumption of intruder’s
knowledge, and the configurations of the synthesis, stay the same as in Section 3.3.
As before, we keep the results of the confidential CE sample, and the unweighted
Synthesizer, for comparison.
With increased weights through greater-than-1 values of c or positive values of g,
we expect to see increased utility preservation by the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo
posterior synthesizers with these local weights adjustments. We report point estimates
and 95% confidence intervals of several key summary statistics and a regression coeffi-
cient, in Table 6 and Table 7 (obtained through bootstrapping). These utility results
suggest that setting g = 0.1 offers improvement in all utility measures, compared to
setting c = 1. Setting c = 1.5, on the other hand, offers smaller utility improvement.
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Table 7: Table of C.I. of 90% quantile (left) and predictor Earner 2 (right) of family
income; results based on different Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesiz-
ers. Note that Earner 2 indicates that the reference person is not an earner.
estimate 95% C.I. estimate 95% C.I.
Data 153916.30 [147582.40, 159603.80] -45826.20 [-49816.29, -41836.11]
Synthesizer 152597.10 [147647.40, 157953.80] -46017.29 [-50239.20, -41795.37]
c = 1, g = 0 145968.90 [141137.70, 150867.30] -44028.77 [-49340.69, -38716.85]
c = 1.5, g = 0 145299.70 [140864.00, 149948.70] -43544.92 [-47654.14, -39435.71]
c = 1, g = 0.1 149157.80 [144024.70, 154207.60] -44827.57 [-49289.40, -40365.73]
To find out whether such utility improvement comes at a price of reduced privacy
protection, we create violin plots to show the identification risk probability distri-
butions in Figure 13. The violin plots show different impacts on identification risks
when setting c = 1.5 or g = 0.1, compared to when setting c = 1. Increasing c
slightly increases the average identification risks (the horizontal bar), while produc-
ing a slightly shorter tail, indicating a better control of the maximum identification
risks. Increasing g, on the other hand, keeps a similar average of identification risks,
while producing a longer tail, indicating a worse control of the maximum identification
risks. Both c and g provide higher privacy protection compared to the unweighted
Synthesizer, in terms of the average and the tail.
In sum, setting c = 1.5 or g = 0.1 for the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo pos-
terior synthesizers offers improvement in utility. Tuning a positive g offers higher
utility improvement, with a higher price of privacy protection reduction. Tuning a
greater-than-1 c offers reasonable utility improvement, producing slightly higher aver-
age identification risks and slightly smaller maximum identification risks. Depending
on the microdata release policy set by the BLS, the proposed local weights adjust-
ments could help the BLS to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off balance when
disseminating synthetic datasets through the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers.
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Figure 13: Violin plots of the identification risk profiles of the confidential CE sample,
the unweighted Synthesizer, and the three pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers.
4 Conclusion
We propose a general framework for statistical agencies to achieve desired utility-risk
trade-off balance when disseminating microdata through synthetic data. Starting
with a synthesizer with high utility but unacceptable level of identification risks, sta-
tistical agencies can proceed to create risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers to
provide a higher degree of privacy protection. Our proposed risk-weighted pseudo
posterior synthesizers formulate a record-indexed weight ∈ [0, 1], which is inversely
proportional to the record-level identification risk probability. The likelihood con-
tribution of each record is exponentiated with the record-indexed weight, and the
resulted pseudo posterior creates the risk-weighted synthesizer that downweights the
likelihood contributions of records with high identification risks, providing higher
privacy protection.
The agencies may begin with marginal identification risk probabilities applied
to any unweighted synthesizer improve privacy protection as compared to the un-
weighted synthesizer. The marginal identification risk probabilities are formulated
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to treat the probabilities of disclosure risk for the records to be independent from
each other. When risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers based on the marginal
identification risk probabilities do not provide sufficient privacy protection, especially
in the case where records with moderate identification risks are exposed to less pri-
vacy protection due to the whack-a-mole phenomenon, the statistical agencies may
utilize pairwise identification risk probabilities to construct the by-record weights.
The pairwise identification risk probabilities tie pairs of records together and induce
dependence among the by-record weights, which offers an overall higher privacy pro-
tection and mitigates the whack-a-mole phenomenon, to some degree. At the same
time, the utility properties of the real data distribution are better preserved by pair-
wise downweighting as each high-risk record is required to be shrunk less due to better
coverage by other records. To offer more flexibility in tuning the risk-utility trade-off,
we propose two local adjustments to our disclosure risk-based weights. These adjust-
ments to the weights should be relatively small in order not to distort the risk profile
achieved using the marginal and the pairwise methods of downweighting.
Our applications to the CE sample show that the pairwise downweighting frame-
work creates risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers with better control of the
identification risks and little loss of utility. Local weight adjustments are shown to
improve utility preservation level with little loss of privacy protection. These features
provide general guidelines for statistical agencies to design risk-weighted pseudo poste-
rior synthesizers to work towards disseminating synthetic data with desired utility-risk
trade-off. We use a flexible finite mixture synthesizer for our CE application, and our
proposed downweighting frameworks, marginal and pairwise, are readily generalizable
to other applications with different synthesizers.
We believe future research is needed to understand how the choice of r affects the
risk-utility trade-off. Results from such research will allow statistical agencies to set
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informed values of r. Another interesting future research direction is extending the
framework to multivariate continuous data, where the ball becomes multi-dimension.
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Abstract
This Supplementary Material contains: i) A few toy examples of identi-
fying “Betty”, to illustrate the marginal probability of identification risk in
Section 2.1 of the main document; ii) Discussion and results of the marginally
risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers with local weights adjustments in
Section 3.4 of the main document.
1 Toy Examples for Marginal Probability of Iden-
tification Risk
These toy examples share the goal to identify a person whose information is collected
in a survey, named “Betty”, given the known pattern p in which Betty is located, and
the true family income, yi.
Recall that the marginal probability of identification risk is defined as,
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In the following 4 scenarios, the number of CUs sharing the same pattern as
Betty, p, is |M (l)p,i | = 13. In each of the 4 scenarios, we include the values of∑
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i in the figure caption. r is the radius
of the ball and assumed the same in both scenarios.
Figure 1: Legends for Betty’s true value, Betty’s synthetic value, and other synthetic
values.
Figure 2 illustrates the case where few records in the pattern are close to Betty’s
true record value for y. This scenario leads to a relatively higher identification dis-
closure probability.
Figure 2:
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Figure 3 illustrates the case where Betty’s true value for y is well covered by
many records in the pattern. This scenario leads to a relatively lower probability of
identification disclosure.
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Figure 4 is similar to the case in Figure 3, but now Betty’s true value for y is not
close to her synthesized value, which leads to T
(l)
i = 0 and an identification disclosure
probability of 0.
Figure 4:
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Figure 5 is similar to the case of Figure 2, but now Betty’s true value for y is not
close to her synthesized value, which leads to T
(l)
i = 0 and an identification disclosure
probability of 0.
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2 Discussion and Results of the Marginally Risk-
weighted Pseudo Posterior Synthesizers
2.1 Strategies of weights adjustments
We propose the following local weights adjustments to the final marginal weights
construction in Section 3.4 in the main document.
αm∗i = min(c× (1− IRi) + g, 1), (2)
where c and g are constants to tune the amount of weighting of all CUs.
We examine the impacts of c and g on the marginally risk-weighted pseudo poste-
rior synthesizers with the following configurations: i) c = 1, g = 0; ii) c = 1.5, g = 0;
iii) c = 1, g = 0.1.
2.2 Marginal weights plots
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Figure 6: Marginal
weights, c = 1, g = 0.
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Figure 7: Marginal
weights, c = 1.5, g = 0.
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Figure 8: Marginal
weights, c = 1, g = 0.1.
2.3 Utility and identification risks results and discussion
The main findings are: i) Setting c = 1.5 or g = 0.1 offers improvement in utility, with
g = 0.1 offering the biggest improvement in every utility measure; ii) Compared to
the utility improvement with c and g on the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers, the improvement offered by c and g on the marginally risk-weighted
pseudo posterior synthesizers is not as satisfactory, and might be deemed insufficient
in some utility measures; iii) Both c = 1.5 and g = 0.1 create shorter tails of the
identification risk distribution, while c = 1.5 slightly increases the average and g = 0.1
keeps a similar average of the identification risks.
Based on these findings, we recommend the proposed local weights adjustments
with c or g on the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers for the BLS
to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off balance.
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Table 1: Table of C.I. of mean family income; results based on different marginally
risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I.
Data 72090.26 [70127.02, 74053.50]
Synthesizer 72377.12 [70412.90, 74415.81]
c = 1, g = 0 76641.95 [72638.03, 81817.03]
c = 1.5, g = 0 71527.38 [69352.11, 73889.61]
c = 1, g = 0.1 72950.40 [70645.43, 75375.39]
Table 2: Table of C.I. of median family income; results based on different marginally
risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I.
Data 50225.15 [48995.01, 52000.00]
Synthesizer 50538.50 [49043.63, 52115.76]
c = 1, g = 0 54229.08 [52877.58, 55537.29]
c = 1.5, g = 0 54376.32 [53081.17, 55702.35]
c = 1, g = 0.1 52664.07 [51309.78, 54073.17]
Table 3: Table of C.I. of 90% quantile of family income; results based on different
marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I.
Data 153916.30 [147582.40, 159603.80]
Synthesizer 152597.10 [147647.40, 157953.80]
Marginal, c = 1 134582.40 [130716.50, 138516.00]
Marginal, c = 1.5 132463.70 [129035.50, 136299.90]
Marginal, g = 0.1 142526.50 [138046.80, 147128.40]
Table 4: Table of C.I. of predictor Earner 2 in the regression analysis; results based
on different marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers.
estimate 95% C.I.
Data -45826.20 [-49816.29, -41836.11]
Synthesizer -46017.29 [-50239.20, -41795.37]
Marginal, c = 1 -34738.85 [-46792.90, -22684.81]
Marginal, c = 1.5 -37687.76 [-42755.65, -32619.88]
Marginal, g = 0.1 -40759.53 [-46084.41, -35434.64]
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Figure 9: Violin plots of the identification risk profiles of the confidential CE sample,
the unweighted Synthesizer, and the three marginally risk-weighted pseudo posterior
synthesizers.
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